Lieutenant General Fedotov Nikolai Vasilyevich. Heads of the Soviet foreign intelligence Vladimir Antonov. Lieutenant General Pyotr Vasilievich Fedotov in the hierarchy of the Soviet state security agencies occupied a position equal to that in Germany

29.10.2020

The head of the Soviet counterintelligence during the war, Pyotr Vasilievich Fedotov, was an ambiguous personality. He looked like a professor or a doctor, but in fact he was one of the most experienced leaders of the state security agencies.

Movie Professor of Counterintelligence
Year of release: 2005 Genre: Documentary Director: Evgeny Dyurich

Academician of counterintelligence

Personality

The appearance of this man was deceiving. Slightly plump, intelligent face, thoughtful look. The thin metal-rimmed glasses made him look more like a university professor than a high-ranking leader of the Stalin-era Lubyanka. However, he was a real "academician" in the world of secret services, a talented analyst and organizer, a real master of counter-espionage. We will not give unambiguous assessments, we will not judge his actions from our distance. We will only present to the readers' judgment individual fragments from the life of Pyotr Fedotov. The personal file of the Chekist General, kept in the secret archive, with the strict inscription "Keep forever" on the yellowed cover, will help us with this.

RED ARMY FIGHTER

Pyotr Fedotov was born on December 18, 1901 in St. Petersburg. His father Vasily Fedotovich was from the peasants of the village of Staroe Rakhino, Starorussky district, Novgorod province. For many years he worked as a conductor and carriage driver of the St. Petersburg horse-drawn carriage, and shortly before his death in 1905, he got a job as a watchman in the Ministry of Education. Peter's mother Pelageya Ivanovna also came from Novgorod peasants, all her life she was engaged in farming and raised four children: three daughters and a son. In the terrible blockade winter of 1942, she shared the fate of thousands of Leningraders who ended up at the Peskarevsky cemetery.

Until the age of fifteen, Peter lived at the expense of his older sisters, tailor-workers Alexandra and Anna, graduated from elementary school and the four-year city school named after Mendeleev. From 1915, he began his independent career, joining the newspaper expedition of the Petrograd Post Office as a spreader and packer of newspapers, in the evenings he worked as a projectionist in private cinemas, first at Mars, and then at Magic Dreams.

In October 1917, Fedotov enrolled in a cell of Bolshevik sympathizers, and at the beginning of 1919, at the age of less than 18, he voluntarily joined the Red Army: he was an ordinary soldier of the 1st Petrograd Communist Brigade, fighting the White Guards on the Eastern and Southern fronts . In the battles near Kupyansk and Valuyki he was shell-shocked and wounded. In the summer of 1919, Peter was accepted into the RCP(b) and sent to political courses at the political department of the Southern Front.

As a student of courses, Fedotov took part in hostilities against the units of General Mamontov, and then he was sent as a political instructor of a company in the 1st Revolutionary Discipline Regiment, which fought in the North Caucasus with the remnants of the White Guard units in the Cossack villages, in Chechnya and Dagestan.

At the end of 1920, the regiment suffered heavy losses and was disbanded, and the young political instructor Fedotov was transferred to work in a special department of the 8th Army as a censor-controller. From that moment on, for many years, fate linked the former Petrograd postal worker with the state security agencies.

OPERATIONAL "UNIVERSITIES"

In less than a year, a capable twenty-year-old guy becomes the head of the information department of the Grozny branch of the GPU. At the same time, his first service promotion came to him. In 1922, in the spirit of that time, saturated with the romance of the revolution, Pyotr Fedotov "was rewarded with a leather suit for hard work and setting up an information apparatus in the district and especially in the fields." Later, other promotions and awards will come to him, and two orders of Lenin, four orders of the Red Banner, as well as the orders of Kutuzov 1st degree, the Red Star and the Badge of Honor will appear on his chest. Moreover, he will receive most of them during the Great Patriotic War. But all this will come later, years later. And then, back in 1923, Fedotov led his first major operation to disarm the Achkhoi-Martan district of Chechnya and defeat the gang of Maza Shadayev.

A year later, a new test: participation in the development and destruction of large (up to 10 thousand people) armed formations of Sheikh Ali Mitaev. At the same time, in the first performance appraisal for the deputy head of the Eastern Department of the Chechen Regional Department of the OGPU Pyotr Fedotov, his immediate supervisor wrote the following review about the young security officer: “As someone who knows all the specifics of Eastern work in his position, he is indispensable. An excellent orientalist in terms of purely analytical work, he also knows the operational industry. Extremely diligent, hardworking and disciplined, a good friend, not decisive. He has the initiative, but is not energetic enough.

In 1925-1926. the disarmament of Chechnya and Dagestan began. Having carried out thorough preparatory work, the deputy chief of the operational group for the area, Fedotov, led the information and intelligence services, the degree of organization of which was highly appreciated by the command. This made it possible to correctly navigate the situation during the period of operations, ensuring their success. At the same time, thanks to the operational positions created by Fedotov among the local population, it was possible to liquidate the armed formations of sheikhs Ilyasov and Akhaev, and subsequently Sheikh Aksaltinsky, without involving the troops of the Red Army.

In 1927, Fedotov was transferred to Rostov-on-Don to the Plenipotentiary Representation of the OGPU for the North Caucasus Territory. Here, as before, he was engaged in so-called political banditry. Therefore, the routes of his business trips remained the same. As a rule, it was Chechnya. Reviews of the new management about detective Fedotov are still high: “A very conscientious, honest and devoted worker. He knows his work well and shows great initiative in it. In performing tasks, he is slow, which pays off with the extreme thoroughness of the work and the thoughtfulness of the approach to it.

At the turn of the 1920-30s. Significant qualitative changes are taking place in the organs of the OGPU. Guidelines in their activities are changing in accordance with party guidelines. Initiated in Moscow, a wave of political processes such as the “case of the Industrial Party” swept across the country. In each republic, region or territory, party leaders demanded that the Chekists keep up with the capital. As a result, local mini-trials arose, where representatives of the old technical and creative intelligentsia, former tsarist officers and military experts of the Red Army, appeared on the docks. A little later, after the assassination of Kirov, supporters of the party opposition, both explicit and fictitious, took their place.

During this difficult period, Pyotr Fedotov, as his career growth, focuses more and more on work in the secret political department of the North Caucasian PGPU. Participation in dispossession, development of Trotskyist and Socialist-Revolutionary groups, local intelligentsia. All this has become integral part his operational biography. Such was the time when "the revolution is not done with white gloves." At the same time, the main line of his activity was still the fight against the nationalist underground.

Curious fact. Serving in such an ideological department, Fedotov remained non-partisan. The party experience that began in 1919 was interrupted by him on his own initiative in 1922. Later in his autobiography, he explained this situation as follows: in the life of the party organization, I moved away from the party and mechanically dropped out of its ranks, which, with the onset of a more mature age, I always strongly condemned.

The “second coming” into the ranks of the CPSU (b) of the senior lieutenant of state security (which corresponded to the rank of major of the Red Army) Pyotr Fedotov took place only at the beginning of 1937. By this time, on the left side of his tunic, the sign “Honored NKVD worker. Experienced and in his prime, the counterintelligence analyst was then considered one of the leading experts on the North Caucasus. Soon he will be transferred to Moscow. Probably the most difficult period of his life will begin. Unlike many others, he will be able to walk on “thin ice” without failing…

THE REPRESSIVE YEARS

After the arrest of the long-term chief of the Lubyanka, Genrikh Yagoda, and his people in the organs, the need for personnel in the central apparatus was high. In June 1937, together with a group of other employees of the North Caucasian UNKVD, Fedotov ended up in the capital and worked as an assistant to the head of the secretariat until October, after which, finally, he received a “profile” position - head of the 7th (eastern) department of the 4th of the Secret Political Department (SPO) of the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB) of the NKVD of the USSR. At this time, the peak of Yezhov's "operational strikes" carried out on the direct orders of the Kremlin. In July 1938, Fedotov became deputy head, and from September 1939 - head of the 4th department.

Fedotov's appointment to such a high post occurred after the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs was headed by the former first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia, Lavrenty Beria, and the GUGB was headed by Vsevolod Merkulov, ex-head of a department of the same party committee. Fedotov turned out to be one of the few who worked in Yezhov's apparatus who was not rejected by Beria, moreover, he received a promotion.

Undoubtedly, Peter's seventeen-year stay in the North Caucasus played a certain role, where Lavrenty Beria, then head of the Transcaucasian OGPU, could have known about his work. But the main thing is still not in this. Fedotov was never listed as close to Yezhov or any of his faithful associates, who ended up on the chopping block along with their people's commissar. He presented an example of a typical "serviceman" pulling his strap. In addition, he did not appear on the lists of "distinguished" in the operational and investigative work in the meat grinder in 1937, but was better known as a good analyst.

However, in fairness, it should be noted that, having become the head of the SPO, the central body of the “secret political police” of the USSR, Fedotov simply could not help but be involved in acts later called illegal mass political repressions. Despite the fact that by that time their peak had already passed, his signature remained on the arrest warrants for many innocent people.

In September 1940, when the whole country lived in anticipation of an imminent war, Commissar of State Security 3rd rank Fedotov was appointed to a new responsible position - head of the 3rd (counterintelligence) department of the GUGB NKVD, which was transformed six months later into the 2nd Directorate of the new people's commissariat - the state security (NKGB).

The appointment of Fedotov as the chief of Soviet counterintelligence coincided with the beginning of the development by the strategists of the Third Reich of operational plans for the invasion of the USSR, which later received the code name "Barbarossa", which entailed the intensification of the work of German intelligence diplomats in Moscow. Therefore, the new head of the 2nd Directorate saw his primary task in making it as difficult as possible for the employees of the embassy of fascist Germany, as well as the embassies of the countries of its allies, primarily Japan, to collect information.

The counterintelligence officers of the NKVD, headed by Pyotr Fedotov, sought to prevent the so-called "tourist" trips around the country by employees of German, Japanese and other diplomatic missions. Their movements and contacts were closely monitored. Sources were acquired among the staff of the embassies, as well as from among the correspondents of foreign newspapers and news agencies. Rarely, but still it was possible to catch on compromising evidence and directly recruit diplomats.

Under Fedotov, perhaps one of the most valuable secret counterintelligence officers of that time appeared in Moscow, the future Hero Soviet Union Nikolai Kuznetsov ("Colonist"), who began working in the capital through the SPO, but in 1940 was transferred to the 2nd Directorate. Unique abilities to the reincarnation of this Ural "nugget" opened up significant operational opportunities for the Chekists.

According to the idea, born in Lubyanka, Kolonist, disguised as a test pilot of the Moscow aircraft factory, was framed by employees of a number of embassies, including those of Germany and Japan. The calculation turned out to be correct, and foreign intelligence diplomats began to show increased interest in the NKVD agent. Thanks to the Colonist, counterintelligence became aware of their intentions, plans and aspirations. The sharpness and seriousness of the combinations carried out by the Colonist is evidenced by the fact that Fedotov personally directed his actions.

In the spring of 1941, Fedotov's subordinates achieved great success. Thanks to a cunningly conducted event, they managed to introduce the technique of auditory control into the office of the chief German intelligence officer in the USSR, the military attaché, General Ernst Kestring. This made it possible in the last pre-war months to report almost daily to the country's leadership about the moods and preparations of the Germans. Incidentally, the transcript dated May 31, 1941, is indicative, shedding light on the root causes of Stalin's serious fears of provocations from Germany. Kestring, talking in his office with the Slovak envoy, declared: “Here it is necessary to carry out some kind of provocation. It is necessary to make sure that some German is killed here, and thereby provoke a war ... "

The German and Japanese embassies were not the only objects of operational attention on the part of Fedotov and his staff. The 2nd Directorate also carried out active and highly productive work in relation to the diplomatic missions of Great Britain, Finland, Turkey, Iran, Slovakia and other countries.

MOSCOW UNDERGROUND

The Great Patriotic War set new tasks for the Soviet special services. There were also organizational changes. In July 1941, the NKGB re-merged into the NKVD, which was still led by Beria. Fedotov remained the head of the 2nd Directorate, but now the NKVD, which was entrusted with the following tasks: accounting and development of German intelligence agencies and the implementation of counterintelligence operations; identification, development and liquidation of enemy special services agents in Moscow; operational work in prisoner-of-war and internee camps; observation and control over the developments of local NKVD bodies; accounting and operational search for enemy agents, traitors and accomplices of the fascist invaders; protection of the diplomatic corps .... Later, when the front line began to move west, another one was added to them: ensuring the clearance of the cities and regions liberated from the invaders from the enemy agents left here and organizing operational work in them.

But the hottest days for the subordinates of Peter Fedotov and Pavel Sudoplatov came when the Nazis stood at the gates of the capital. In case the Germans captured Moscow, a powerful underground was created, staffed by Chekists, their unspoken assistants, citizens who voluntarily expressed a desire to carry out special tasks behind enemy lines.

The scale of the preparatory work just impressive. The occupiers were in big trouble in Moscow. According to the plan of the Lubyanka leadership, 243 people were transferred to an illegal position, of which 36 groups were formed, which received operational-combat, sabotage and reconnaissance tasks. 78 people were trained for the individual implementation of reconnaissance and sabotage-terrorist actions.

In the capital and the Moscow region there were safe houses, warehouses with weapons, ammunition, explosives and incendiaries, fuel, food, as well as safe houses under the guise of small workshops, shops, hairdressers, in which radio equipment, weapons were supposed to be repaired and special equipment for underground workers was made. All groups were provided with carefully concealed radio stations. Illegals received Required documents, got a job or already worked as handicraftsmen, sellers of stalls and pharmacies, teachers, artists, chauffeurs, watchmen, church ministers, etc. A significant part of the Moscow underground was being prepared for infiltration into the administrative apparatus of the occupation authorities and the intelligence agencies of the German army.

Tasks, legends for legalization, communication methods and passwords were thoroughly worked out with each operational group and singles, classes were held on, so to speak, special combat training, behavior in case of detention and interrogations. Buildings and objects that could be used by the Nazis were studied by members of the task forces for possible sabotage and terrorist attacks. The families of the underground members were taken to the rear areas.

The head of all this "economy" was entrusted directly to the head of the 2nd Directorate of the NKVD, Pyotr Fedotov, who, according to the plan of the leadership of the people's commissariat, having gone into an illegal position, was supposed to coordinate the activities of all agent groups left in the capital.

At the beginning of 1943, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs underwent another reorganization. As before the war, the NKGB was separated from it. Pyotr Fedotov was still in charge of management under #2 in the newly recreated People's Commissariat. At the same time, a few more tasks were added to the tasks of the counterintelligence department: operational maintenance of industrial facilities, the fight against anti-Soviet elements within the country and the nationalist armed groups of the UPA and OUN in Ukraine, as well as the "forest brothers" in the Baltic states. Among the activities carried out by the security officers of the 2nd Directorate of the NKGB, counterintelligence support for the conferences of the heads of government of the allied powers - the USSR, the USA and Great Britain in Tehran (November-December 1943), Yalta (February 1945) and Potsdam (July-August) stands apart. 1945).

MOLOTOV - HEAD AND ... PROTECTOR

After the war, there was a change of leadership in the Lubyanka. Key posts in the MGB system were occupied by the people of Viktor Abakumov, head of the Smersh Main Directorate of the NPO of the USSR. Lavrenty Beria was “thrown” by Stalin to solve the “atomic problem”, and Vsevolod Merkulov, who seemed too soft to the leader (“the minister of state security should be afraid”), was sent to another job.

At the end of 1947, the structure of the Soviet security agencies again underwent changes. A centralized analytical center is being created to process information coming through the channels of foreign policy and military intelligence. This was Stalin's answer to the creation of the US CIA. The new body was called the Information Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, it included the 1st (intelligence) Directorate of the MGB and the GRU of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. Vyacheslav Molotov became the head of the Committee, and his deputy was Lieutenant-General Pyotr Fedotov, whose penchant for analytical work had long been known in the Lubyanka and Staraya Square.

Fedotov's contribution to the development of domestic intelligence is characterized in a military dry, but rather capacious lines from his performance appraisal (1951): to develop practical tasks for organizing intelligence work in each individual country. He carried out a number of activities aimed at strengthening the central office and improving its work.”

In February 1952, the Information Committee was abolished, and Fedotov, who was removed from the staff, had to wait for a new appointment for a year. This was again by no means an easy period of his life. Molotov was threatened with arrest, after which, it is possible that Fedotov could also end up in a cell ... But this time, fate was favorable to him.

After Stalin's death, the Ministry of State Security merged into the Ministry of Internal Affairs, headed again by Beria. At the same time, Fedotov again received the post of head of the counterintelligence department, where he worked for a year and a half. The arrest of Beria and the defeat of his "team" from among the generals of the state security and internal affairs agencies in no way affected the fate of Fedotov, who continued to regularly head the Soviet counterintelligence, including as part of a new department - the State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Apparently, Molotov helped Pyotr Vasilyevich not to fall into the number of Beria's "conspirators" with all the ensuing consequences.

AT THE DOWN OF A SERVICE CAREER

What was the secret of Fedotov's "longevity" in leadership positions in the Lubyanka? A positive role in this was played by his high professionalism and diligence. He, apparently, never aspired to play any independent role, not to mention participation in the behind-the-scenes apparatus, and even more so, political struggle (let us recall, for example, the fact of his departure from the party at the dawn of his service in the organs). But the main thing still lies in the lack of engagement of his personality on the part of such figures as Yezhov, Beria or Abakumov.

The first and very serious crack in the career of Pyotr Fedotov received in 1956, when, after the XX Congress of the CPSU and the exposure of Stalin's personality cult at it, he was "exiled" to higher school KGB for the post of deputy head of the editorial and publishing department. It is noteworthy that the persecution of Fedotov, who was accused of participating in mass repressions, took place at a time when the chairman of the KGB of the USSR was none other than Ivan Serov, on whose conscience lay not only illegal arrests and almost all operations to resettle repressed peoples, but and hundreds of death sentences, which he signed with his own hand, being repeatedly chairman of the meetings of the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR.

Perhaps Fedotov's disgrace testified to the flaring up struggle in the upper echelons of power, when Khrushchev's henchman (Serov) sought to remove from a key post in state security a person close to Molotov, who had gone over to the opposition to the new party leader? Not excluded.

However, for Fedotov, this was not the worst option, if we recall the fate of his colleagues Pavel Sudoplatov and Naum Eitingon (Sudoplatov's deputy), who were sentenced to many years in prison, or Pavel Fitin (former chief of foreign intelligence), who was in charge of a photo studio in Moscow. Not to mention the executed Viktor Abakumov and Solomon Milyshtein.

"Finished off" Fedotov three years later, when the KGB found itself under the recent first secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League Alexander Shelepin, who, apparently, was in a hurry to purge the Committee of the generals of the Stalin era. As a result, Pyotr Fedotov was demoted, expelled from the party and fired from the state security agencies "due to inconsistency with his position", but at the same time he retained his awards and, most importantly, his pension, taking into account the need to support and feed his minor daughter.

Expelled from the Lubyanka and excommunicated from the work to which he devoted his whole life, the seriously ill Pyotr Vasilyevich Fedotov soon died after that (1963). For the first time, his name and portrait appeared only three years ago in the book "Lubyanka, 2. From the history of domestic counterintelligence", prepared by the FSB.

Personality

RED ARMY FIGHTER

Until the age of fifteen, Peter lived at the expense of his older sisters, tailor-workers Alexandra and Anna, graduated from elementary school and the four-year city school named after Mendeleev. Since 1915, he began his independent labor activity, having entered the newspaper expedition of the Petrograd Post Office as a spreader and packer of newspapers, in the evenings he worked as a projectionist in private cinemas, first in Mars, and then in Magic Dreams.

In October 1917, Fedotov enrolled in a cell of Bolshevik sympathizers, and at the beginning of 1919, at less than 18 years old, he voluntarily joined the Red Army: he was an ordinary soldier of the 1st Petrograd Communist Brigade, fighting the White Guards on the Eastern and Southern fronts . In the battles near Kupyansk and Valuyki he was shell-shocked and wounded. In the summer of 1919, Peter was accepted into the RCP(b) and sent to political courses at the political department of the Southern Front.

OPERATIONAL "UNIVERSITIES"

A year later, a new test: participation in the development and destruction of large (up to 10 thousand people) armed formations of Sheikh Ali Mitaev. At the same time, in the first performance appraisal for the deputy head of the Eastern Department of the Chechen Regional Department of the OGPU Pyotr Fedotov, his immediate supervisor wrote the following review about the young Chekist: operational branch. Extremely assiduous, hardworking and disciplined, a good friend, not decisive. He has the initiative, but is not energetic enough. "

In 1927, Fedotov was transferred to Rostov-on-Don to the Plenipotentiary Representation of the OGPU for the North Caucasus Territory. Here, as before, he was engaged in so-called political banditry. Therefore, the routes of his business trips remained the same. As a rule, it was Chechnya. The reviews of the new leadership about the detective Fedotov are still high: "A very conscientious, honest and devoted worker. He knows his work well, shows great initiative in it. He is slow in completing tasks, which pays off with the extreme thoroughness of his work and thoughtful approach to it."

At the turn of the 1920-30s. Significant qualitative changes are taking place in the organs of the OGPU. Guidelines in their activities are changing in accordance with party guidelines. Initiated in Moscow, a wave of political processes such as the "case of the Industrial Party" swept across the country. In each republic, region or territory, party leaders demanded that the Chekists keep up with the capital. As a result, local mini-trials arose, where representatives of the old technical and creative intelligentsia, former tsarist officers and military experts of the Red Army, appeared on the docks. A little later, after the assassination of Kirov, supporters of the party opposition, both explicit and fictitious, took their place.

During this difficult period, Pyotr Fedotov, as his career growth, focuses more and more on work in the secret political department of the North Caucasian PGPU. Participation in dispossession, development of Trotskyist and Socialist-Revolutionary groups, local intelligentsia. All this became an integral part of his operational biography. Such was the time when "the revolution is not made with white gloves." At the same time, the main line of his activity was still the fight against the nationalist underground.

Curious fact. Serving in such an ideological department, Fedotov remained non-partisan. The party experience begun in 1919 was interrupted by him on his own initiative in 1922. Later in his autobiography he explained this situation as follows: "... due to political immaturity and negligent attitude to party duties and assignments, neglecting the advice of senior comrades to study and actively participate in the life of the party organization, I left the party and mechanically dropped out of its ranks, which, with the onset of a more mature age, I always strongly condemned.

The “second coming” into the ranks of the CPSU (b) of the senior lieutenant of state security (which corresponded to the rank of major of the Red Army) Pyotr Fedotov took place only at the beginning of 1937. By this time, on the left side of his tunic, for two years now, the sign “Honored NKVD worker. Experienced and in his prime, the counterintelligence analyst was then considered one of the leading experts on the North Caucasus. Soon he will be transferred to Moscow. Probably the most difficult period of his life will begin. Unlike many, he will be able to walk on "thin ice" without failing...

THE REPRESSIVE YEARS

After the arrest of the long-term chief of the Lubyanka, Genrikh Yagoda, and his people in the organs, the need for personnel in the central apparatus was high. In June 1937, together with a group of other employees of the North Caucasian UNKVD, Fedotov ended up in the capital and worked as an assistant to the head of the secretariat until October, after which, finally, he received a "profile" position - head of the 7th (eastern) department of the 4th of the Secret Political Department (SPO) of the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB) of the NKVD of the USSR. At this time, the peak of Yezhov's "operational strikes" carried out on the direct orders of the Kremlin. In July 1938, Fedotov became deputy head, and from September 1939 - head of the 4th department.

Fedotov's appointment to such a high post happened already after the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs was headed by the former first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia Lavrenty Beria, and the GUGB was headed by Vsevolod Merkulov, the ex-head of a department of the same party committee. Fedotov turned out to be one of the few who worked in Yezhov's apparatus who was not rejected by Beria, moreover, he received a promotion.

However, in fairness, it should be noted that, having become the head of the SPO, the central body of the "secret political police" of the USSR, Fedotov simply could not help being involved in acts later called illegal mass political repressions. Despite the fact that by that time their peak had already passed, his signature remained on the arrest warrants for many innocent people.

In September 1940, when the whole country lived in anticipation of an imminent war, Commissar of State Security 3rd rank Fedotov was appointed to a new responsible position - the head of the 3rd (counterintelligence) department of the NKVD GUGB, which was transformed six months later into the 2nd Directorate of the new people's commissariat - the state security (NKGB).

Under Fedotov, perhaps one of the most valuable secret counterintelligence officers of that time appeared in Moscow, the future Hero of the Soviet Union Nikolai Kuznetsov ("Colonist"), who began working in the capital through the SPO, but in 1940 was transferred to the 2nd Control. The unique ability to transform this Ural "nugget" opened up significant operational opportunities for the Chekists.

In the spring of 1941, Fedotov's subordinates achieved great success. Thanks to a cunningly conducted event, they managed to introduce the technique of auditory control into the office of the chief German intelligence officer in the USSR, the military attaché, General Ernst Kestring. This made it possible in the last pre-war months to report almost daily to the country's leadership about the moods and preparations of the Germans. Incidentally, the transcript dated May 31, 1941, is indicative, shedding light on the root causes of Stalin's serious fears of provocations from Germany. Kestring, talking in his office with the Slovak envoy, declared: "Here it is necessary to carry out some kind of provocation. It is necessary to make sure that some German is killed here, and thereby provoke a war ..."

MOSCOW UNDERGROUND

The Great Patriotic War set new tasks for the Soviet special services. There were also organizational changes. In July 1941, the NKGB re-merged into the NKVD, which was still led by Beria. Fedotov remained the head of the 2nd Directorate, but now the NKVD, which was entrusted with the following tasks: accounting and development of German intelligence agencies and the implementation of counterintelligence operations; identification, development and liquidation of enemy special services agents in Moscow; operational work in prisoner-of-war and internee camps; observation and control over the developments of local NKVD bodies; accounting and operational search for enemy agents, traitors and accomplices of the fascist invaders; protection of the diplomatic corps .... Later, when the front line began to move west, another one was added to them: ensuring the cleaning of the cities and regions liberated from the invaders from the enemy agents left here and organizing operational work in them.

The scale of the preparatory work done is simply impressive. The occupiers were in big trouble in Moscow. According to the plan of the Lubyanka leadership, 243 people were transferred to an illegal position, of which 36 groups were formed, which received operational-combat, sabotage and reconnaissance tasks. 78 people were trained for the individual implementation of reconnaissance and sabotage-terrorist actions.

In the capital and the Moscow region there were safe houses, warehouses with weapons, ammunition, explosives and incendiaries, fuel, food, as well as safe houses under the guise of small workshops, shops, hairdressers, in which radio equipment, weapons were supposed to be repaired and special equipment for underground workers was made. All groups were provided with carefully concealed radio stations. Illegals received the necessary documents, got a job or already worked as handicraftsmen, sellers of stalls and pharmacies, teachers, artists, drivers, watchmen, church ministers, etc. A significant part of the Moscow underground was being prepared for infiltration into the administrative apparatus of the occupation authorities and the intelligence agencies of the German army.

At the beginning of 1943, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs underwent another reorganization. As before the war, the NKGB was separated from it. Pyotr Fedotov was still in charge of management under #2 in the newly recreated People's Commissariat. At the same time, a few more tasks were added to the tasks of the counterintelligence department: operational maintenance of industrial facilities, the fight against anti-Soviet elements within the country and the nationalist armed groups of the UPA and OUN in Ukraine, as well as the "forest brothers" in the Baltic states. Among the activities carried out by the Chekists of the 2nd Directorate of the NKGB, counterintelligence support for the conferences of the heads of government of the allied powers - the USSR, the USA and Great Britain in Tehran (November-December 1943), Yalta (February 1945) and Potsdam (July-August) stands apart. 1945).

MOLOTOV - HEAD AND ... PROTECTOR

After the war, there was a change of leadership in the Lubyanka. Key posts in the MGB system were occupied by people of Viktor Abakumov, head of the Smersh Main Directorate of the NPO of the USSR. Lavrenty Beria was "thrown" by Stalin to solve the "atomic problem", and Vsevolod Merkulov, who seemed too soft to the leader ("the minister of state security should be afraid"), was sent to another job.

At the end of 1947, the structure of the Soviet security agencies again underwent changes. A centralized analytical center is being created to process information coming through the channels of foreign policy and military intelligence. This was Stalin's answer to the creation of the US CIA. The new body was called the Information Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, it included the 1st (intelligence) Directorate of the MGB and the GRU of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. Vyacheslav Molotov became the head of the Committee, and his deputy was Lieutenant General Pyotr Fedotov, whose penchant for analytical work had long been known in Lubyanka and Staraya Square.

Fedotov's contribution to the development of domestic intelligence is characterized in a military dry, but rather capacious lines from his performance appraisal (1951): "... He made a lot of efforts to strengthen the foreign intelligence apparatus, in particular in the selection and replenishment of it with the appropriate workers, as well as to develop practical tasks for organizing intelligence work in each individual country. He carried out a number of activities aimed at strengthening the central apparatus and improving its work."

After Stalin's death, the Ministry of State Security merged into the Ministry of Internal Affairs, headed again by Beria. At the same time, Fedotov again received the post of head of the counterintelligence department, where he worked for a year and a half. The arrest of Beria and the defeat of his "team" from among the generals of the state security and internal affairs bodies in no way affected the fate of Fedotov, who continued to regularly head the Soviet counterintelligence, including as part of a new department - the State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Apparently, Molotov helped Pyotr Vasilyevich not to fall into the number of Beria's "conspirators" with all the ensuing consequences.

AT THE DOWN OF A SERVICE CAREER

What was the secret of Fedotov's "longevity" in leadership positions in the Lubyanka? A positive role in this was played by his high professionalism and diligence. He, apparently, never aspired to play any independent role, not to mention participation in the behind-the-scenes apparatus, and even more so - political struggle (let us recall, for example, the fact of his departure from the party at the dawn of service in the organs). But the main thing still lies in the lack of engagement of his personality on the part of such figures as Yezhov, Beria or Abakumov.

The first and very serious crack in the career of Pyotr Fedotov was in 1956, when, after the XX Congress of the CPSU and the exposure of Stalin's personality cult, he was "exiled" to the Higher School of the KGB to the post of deputy head of the editorial and publishing department. It is noteworthy that the persecution of Fedotov, who was accused of participating in mass repressions, took place at a time when the chairman of the KGB of the USSR was none other than Ivan Serov, on whose conscience lay not only illegal arrests and almost all operations to resettle repressed peoples, but and hundreds of death sentences, which he signed with his own hand, being repeatedly chairman of the meetings of the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR.

"Finished off" Fedotov three years later, when the KGB found itself under the recent first secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League Alexander Shelepin, who, apparently, was in a hurry to purge the Committee of the generals of the Stalin era. As a result, Pyotr Fedotov was demoted, expelled from the party and fired from the state security agencies "due to inconsistency with his position," but at the same time he retained his awards and, most importantly, his pension, taking into account the need to support and feed his minor daughter.

There are a number of versions of the unexpected release of Kubatkin from his post. One of them suggests that he himself filed a report on the transfer to another job, not considering it possible to head such a responsible section, since he had no experience of working abroad and did not know foreign languages. It is difficult to agree with this version, primarily because Kubatkin had considerable experience in organizational work and had already begun to form a team of highly professional intelligence officers. In addition, a military man, lieutenant general, awarded the orders of Lenin, the Red Banner, Kutuzov I and II degrees, the Red Banner of Labor, two orders of the Red Star, many medals, as well as the honorary badge "Honored Worker of the NKVD" could not succumb to difficulties . Military people do not discuss the orders of their superiors, but carry them out.

Apparently, the reason for the transition to another job was caused by other circumstances. And they hid, most likely, in the sphere of big politics, since at that time the so-called "Leningrad case" was already unfolding, the details of which were not subject to publicity. Accusations fabricated by Stalin's inner circle against the "participants in this case" in an attempt to split the party, as well as in espionage, led to a brutal reprisal against the Leningrad leaders.

All the convicts were charged that, having allegedly created an anti-party group, they carried out subversive wrecking work aimed at opposing the Leningrad Party organization Central Committee party, turning it into a support for the fight against the party and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Victims of repression in connection with the "Leningrad affair" were all the leaders of the regional, city and district party organizations, almost all Soviet and state figures who, after the Great Patriotic War, were nominated from Leningrad for leadership work in the central party and Soviet apparatus, as well as in other regional party organizations.

Only in Leningrad region more than two thousand communists were released from party and Soviet work.

But while Zhdanov was alive, Kubatkin was not touched. In November 1946, he was appointed head of the state security department for the Gorky region. On March 30, 1949, Kubatkin was dismissed from the state security agencies "for the impossibility of further use" and was appointed deputy chairman of the Saratov Regional Executive Committee. Only in July 1949 was a sanction received for his arrest in the "Leningrad case". The warrant for Kubatkin's arrest read: "While working in leadership positions in Leningrad, he maintained a criminal relationship with a group of persons hostile to the party and the government."

October 27, 1950 P.N. Kubatkin was sentenced by the Military Collegium Supreme Court USSR to capital punishment and shot on the same day.

Members of the family of Peter Nikolaevich were also repressed. His wife was sentenced to fifteen years in labor camps, and his seventeen-year-old student son was sentenced to ten years.

At the beginning of 1954, on behalf of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the USSR Prosecutor's Office audited the "Leningrad case" and found that it was falsified from beginning to end. On May 26, 1954, Pyotr Nikolaevich Kubatkin and his family members were completely rehabilitated.

Chapter 2. FEDOTOV PETER VASILIEVICH

On September 7, 1946, Lieutenant General Pyotr Vasilyevich Fedotov, who replaced Pyotr Nikolayevich Kubatkin, headed the foreign intelligence of the USSR state security agencies. The day before his appointment, he was approved as Deputy Minister of State Security.

As we noted above, in May 1947, the state security agencies of the Soviet Union underwent another reorganization. At the suggestion of V.M. Molotov, under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, a centralized analytical center was created to process information coming through the channels of foreign policy and military intelligence, as well as from Soviet diplomats in various countries peace.

This was the Soviet leadership's response to the creation in the United States of a single intelligence community headed by the Central Intelligence Agency, whose director headed this super agency, while simultaneously being the coordinator of the entire intelligence system of the United States.

Bearing in mind that in Soviet foreign intelligence until 1943 there was no information and analytical unit, designed to identify grains of reliable information from the general flow of various intelligence information, including disinformation, Stalin approved the proposal of his closest associate and gave the go-ahead to the creation of the Information Committee ( KI) under the direction of Molotov.

In "Essays on the History of Russian Foreign Intelligence" on this occasion, in particular, it says:

“On May 30, 1947, the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a resolution on the establishment of the Committee of Information (CI) under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which was entrusted with the tasks of political, military, scientific and technical intelligence. As a result, the intelligence services of the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Defense were merged into a single body, headed by V.M. Molotov, who at that time was Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and at the same time Minister of Foreign Affairs. An experienced security officer, who in the past led the work of intelligence and counterintelligence units of the Ministry of State Security, P.V. was appointed his deputy, who was in charge of the foreign intelligence section. Fedotov. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Ya. A. Malik and from the Ministry of Defense - F.F. Kuznetsov. They represented the interests of their departments in the Committee.

Such a structure, as conceived by the reformers, was supposed to facilitate better coordination of various intelligence units, focus their efforts on the main areas, and most importantly, would allow intelligence to be placed under the direct control of the country's leadership. Abroad, in the explored countries, the institute of chief residents was created. They had to ensure greater focus on the activities of "legal" residencies based on the foreign policy guidelines of the Soviet government.

In this status, the Information Committee existed until February 1949, when, after the departure of V.M. Molotov from the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Committee was transferred under the auspices of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the new Minister of Foreign Affairs A.Ya. Vyshinsky. However, he did not remain at the head of the CI for long. In September of the same year, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs V.A. Zorin. S.R. became his first deputy, responsible for the current operational work of the entire intelligence service. Savchenko, who previously headed the Ministry of State Security of Ukraine. And P.F. Fedotov remained one of the vice-chairmen of the CI and continued to be engaged in the operational activities of foreign intelligence.

So, in May 1947, 47-year-old Lieutenant General Pyotr Vasilievich Fedotov, who had earlier, on September 7, 1946, replaced Pyotr Nikolayevich Kubatkin as head of foreign intelligence of the state security agencies, became the deputy head of the CI for foreign intelligence. Before joining the intelligence service, Fedotov headed the 2nd (counterintelligence) department of the NKGB and became known as one of the most powerful analysts of the Soviet state security agencies.

Pyotr Fedotov was born on December 18, 1900 in St. Petersburg in the family of a horse-drawn conductor. His father Vasily Fedotovich was from the peasants of the village of Staroe Rakhino, Starorussky district, Novgorod province. For many years he served as a conductor and car driver on the St. Petersburg city horse-drawn railway, in common parlance - horse-drawn carriages, and shortly before his death in 1905, he got a job as a watchman at the Ministry of Public Education Russian Empire. Peter's mother Pelageya Ivanovna also traced her ancestry to the peasants of the Novgorod province, was illiterate and, according to the custom of that time, did not work anywhere, taking care of the household and raising four children: three daughters and an only son.

Wikipedia has articles about other people with that surname, see Fedotov. Wikipedia has articles about other people named Fedotov, Semyon. Semyon Vasilievich Fedotov Date of birth ... Wikipedia

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Wikipedia has articles about other people with that surname, see Fedotov. Fedotov, Pyotr: Fedotov, Pyotr Vasilyevich (1900 −1963) head of the NKVD, MGB and KGB, lieutenant general. Fedotov, Pyotr Ivanovich Hero of the Soviet Union, military leader (cavalry) ... Wikipedia

Wikipedia has articles about other people with that surname, see Fedotov. Fedotov, Semyon: Fedotov, Semyon Alexandrovich (born 1992) Russian football player. Fedotov, Semyon Vasilyevich (1913 1980) participant in the Great Patriotic War, commander of a rifle ... ... Wikipedia

Fedotov Alexander Vasilievich Encyclopedia "Aviation"

Fedotov Alexander Vasilievich- A. V. Fedotov Fedotov Alexander Vasilyevich (1932-1984) - Soviet test pilot, major general of aviation (1983), Hero of the Soviet Union (1966), Honored Test Pilot of the USSR (1969), master of sports of international class (1976). ... … Encyclopedia "Aviation"

- (1932 84) Honored Test Pilot of the USSR (1966), Major General of Aviation (1983), Hero of the Soviet Union (1966), International Master of Sports (1976). Tests of a number of experimental supersonic aircraft, including MiG 21, E 266. World ... ... Big Encyclopedic Dictionary

- (1932 1984) Soviet test pilot, Major General of Aviation (1983), Hero of the Soviet Union (1966), Honored Test Pilot of the USSR (1969), International Master of Sports (1976). In the Soviet Army since 1950. He graduated from the flight school (1953), ... ... Encyclopedia of technology

Books

Neonatology and pathology of newborn animals. Textbook, Fedotov Sergey Vasilyevich, Udalov Gennady Mikhailovich, Belozerzeva Natalya Sergeevna. AT study guide describes the main physiological processes occurring in the body of the fetus and mother; features of the formation, growth and development of newborns; diagnosis, treatment and...
Veterinary obstetrics with neonatology and biotechnology of animal reproduction. Practicum, Fedotov Sergey Vasilyevich. The training manual considers educational material on veterinary obstetrics, neonatology and biotechnology of animal reproduction, taking into account the requirements of the modular training system. For a deeper...